# How BeyondTrust EPM (PMfM) Changes macOS Behavior

**James Reynolds** 

## About James Reynolds

- U of U BMus 1999
- 25 years system administration at CFA, Marriott Library, Biology (SBS)
- Security is my "hobby" because I've learned a things for my own reassurance
  - Read a lot of Bruce Schneier and attended a lot of SaintCONs
- I've been logging in as a non-admin for probably 15 years
  - I have a good understanding of most macOS auth\* mechanisms
  - Read a lot of docs and attended a lot of WWDCs



## Lots of Names

- PMfM Privilege Management for Mac, the preferred name
- EPM-M Endpoint Privilege Management-Mac
- PMM Privilege Management Mac
- The reason: (<u>https://www.beyondtrust.com/brand/avecto</u>)

## **Bomgar is Now BeyondTrust**

Bomgar is still the most secure remote support software in the world. Now called BeyondTrust Remote Support, it's trusted by more customers than ever. Discover what's new with a free trial.

## **Avecto is Now BeyondTrust**

Avecto Defendpoint is still the best way to implement least privilege across devices. Now, it's called BeyondTrust Endpoint Privilege Management. Watch a demo to learn what's new.

## **About This Presentation**

- This is not about how to use PMfM
  - This is about how PMfM changes the default macOS behavior
  - I am not a PMfM expert!!!
- Why am I doing this presentation?
  - I know macOS security too well and freaked out at what happened
  - I'm too untrusting and I dislike my user experience changing
- I tried to target it for macOS newbies (and related it to Linux where I could)

## Agenda

- Should We Be Doing This?
- macOS Security Basics
- The Default Behavior
- Userland macOS Security Components
- PMfM Changes

# Should We Be Doing This?

- macOS comes with built-in security system
  - Modularity allows extending and swapping of elements
    - Can add biometrics, MFA, or 3rd party authenticator
    - 3rd party authorization mechanisms
    - It is possible to gut the entire macOS security setup and replace it



# Why Change Things?

- Historically, "Security" meant not trusting the OS vendor
- Centralization
  - Improving the worst security by decreasing the best security
- Auditing and compliance
- Principle of least privilege



Give users only those privileges which are required to perform their duties

# What Could Possibly Go Wrong?

Crowdstrike's crash is "the largest IT failure in history" 



















## What Could Possibly Go Wrong?

- The dust hasn't settled yet
  - Did Microsoft and Crowdstrike both push updates at the same time?
- Estimated cost up to \$10B
- 2023 ransomware payments estimated at \$1.1B
- Apr 2023 Apr 2024 Crowdstrike revenue was \$3.3B
- Minimal consequences will mean that companies will be careless



"Redundancies are unprofitable. Being slow and careful is unprofitable. Being less embedded in and less essential and having less access to the customers' networks and machines is unprofitable—at least in the short term, by which these companies are measured. This is true for companies like CrowdStrike. It's also true for CrowdStrike's customers, who also didn't have resilience, redundancy, or backup systems in place for failures such as this because they are also an expense that affects short-term profitability... We have to deliberately break things and keep breaking them. This repeated process of breaking and fixing will make these systems reliable. And then a willingness to embrace inefficiencies will make these systems resilient. But the economic incentives point companies in the other direction, to build their systems as brittle as they can possibly get away with."

**Bruce Schneier** 

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/07/the-crowdstrike-outage-and-market-driven-brittleness.html

# Who Do You Trust More?

- Microsoft blames EU as the reason it can't secure Windows like Apple secures macOS<sup>1</sup>
- This isn't funny because Apple's ability to lockdown the hardware actually puts Macs at a greater risk of turning into worse bricks<sup>2</sup>
- Do you trust the OS vendor, the *hardware* vendor, or the security tool vendor more?  $\bullet$
- Modify this critical behavior with extreme caution!
- Blanket unquestioning trust is a BAD IDEA

apple-secures-macos-after-crowdstrike-outage/ar-BB1qp2TT 2016/02/29/el-capitan-system-integrity-protection-update-breaks-ethernet/, https://eclecticlight.co/2024/07/22/could-our-macs-becrowdstruck/



- 1. <u>https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/news/microsoft-blames-european-commission-agreement-as-reason-it-cant-secure-windows-like-</u>
- 2. https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2021/11/why-macos-updates-might-brick-your-mac-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/, https://tidbits.com/

# PMfM Is Not "Fire and Forget"

- Threats and Vulns are always being discovered
- Every update and config change creates risk
- Each customer's setup is unique...
- Do you trust yourself to race a Ferrari?
- "With great power comes great responsibility"
   Uncle Ben
- There are no solutions, only trade-offs
  - You get the principle of least privilege, but you're responsible

discoverec eates risk



## Into the Weeds We Go!



## macOS Security Basics

- PMfM is pointless if you don't do the other things
- A lot of this came from Apple securing the iPhone from the nation states
- Securing macOS begins before the computer is booted the 1st time
- I'm just going to run through this, please see other sources for details

https://support.apple.com/guide/security https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment

## Supervision

- Enroll the computer in an MDM
- Locks the device to an organization and prevents MDM unenrollment
- Turn on with Apple School Manager
- How to tell if it's on for a device?
  - System Settings->Privacy & Security->Profiles

https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/about-device-supervision-dep1d89f0bff/web

## "This Mac is supervised and managed" (and "MDM Profile" can't be removed)



## Jamf PreStage Enrolment

- PreStage Enrollment requires Automated Device Enrollment
  - Set Recovery Lock Password
  - Enable/disable Activation Lock https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/activation-lock-depf4ab94ef1/web
- Recovery Lock can be set after Enrollment https://gingerscripting.com/setting-an-apple-silicon-recovery-lock-password-through-the-jamf-api/

## https://learn.jamf.com/en-US/bundle/jamf-pro-documentation-10.40.0/page/Computer PreStage Enrollments.html

## Recovery Lock Password **Boot Protection**

- recoveryOS can
  - Change Security setting (Full, Reduced, Permissive)
  - Erase the hard drive
  - Run terminal commands (disable SIPS)
  - Use Safari unfiltered

https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/startup-security-dep5810e849c/web

DFU Mode & Apple Configurator can still erase a Mac



## Activation Lock **Theft Protection**

- You don't want users locking your devices

## https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/activation-lock-depf4ab94ef1/web

## The First User Account

- Is added to the admin group
- Has a SecureToken
  - Used to unencrypt FileVault (FDE or Full Disk Encryption)
  - Used to give other users Secure Tokens
  - This is a setting is saved in a user's Directory Service record
- Is a "volume owner" (I don't know where this setting is saved)
- "Bootstrap token" allows an MDM to create SecureTokens and set volume owners



## Volume Owner

- Volume Owner + Standard user
  - Can update OS
- Volume Owner + Admin user
  - Can change which version of macOS can boot
  - Enable third-party kernel extensions (kexts are deprecated)
  - Can "Erase All Contents and Settings"

https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/use-secure-and-bootstrap-tokens-dep24dbdcf9e/web

## **Encrypt the Boot Disk**

Using MDM to encrypt stores the keys in the MDM ightarrow



## The Default Behavior

Thursday, September 12

5:12

uter will automatically restart and autologin.

Name

Enter Password

Your password is required to log in

Your screen is being observed 🗂 🛛 🖞

## The Default Behavior

- The different ways to use the default behavior
  - admin (the 1st user)
  - standard with the admin password ("power user")
  - standard
  - guest

## Standard vs Admin User

- /Applications read only
- Can't change most configs unless user has an admin password
  - There are no silent denies, a password prompt is always displayed
- no sudo access, however:
  - `su admin` + `sudo`
  - modify group memberships, or /etc/sudoers



## The Standard User + Admin Password

- This is what everyone (including you) should be using but few are
  - ARD requires logging in as admin to set a config
  - A very few apps require the user to login as admin
  - I've been using standard with the admin password for over 15 years

## **Userland macOS Security Components**

- Configuration Profiles
- Directory Service
- Filesystem permissions
- sudo
- Authorization Framework

## **Configuration Profiles**

- This topic is covered in depth elsewhere and not relevant to PMfM
- This is Apple's endorsed way to manage computers using MDM
- I include it here because profiles can enable and disable many OS features including system preferences and it can block applications from running
  - It does not have ways to allow elevating permissions though
  - It should be noted that there are 3rd party apps that do elevation, like https://github.com/robjschroeder/Elevate and https://github.com/SAP/ macOS-enterprise-privileges

## Directory Services

- This topic is covered in depth elsewhere and not relevant to PMfM
- Users, groups, computers, etc.
- Default: /var/db/dslocal
- account server)

## LDAP, Active Directory (System Settings -> Users and Groups -> Network

## **Filesystem Permissions**

- 3 main areas
  - Cryptex (CRYPTographically-sealed EXTension) https://support.apple.com/guide/security/signed-system-volume-security-secd698747c9/web https://eclecticlight.co/2023/04/05/how-cryptexes-are-changing-macos-ventura/
  - User: POSIX (0755) + NFSv4 ACLs (`ls -le ~`)
  - Apps: TCC + MAS sandboxes https://eclecticlight.co/2023/02/11/permissions-sip-and-tcc-whos-controlling-access/
- SIPs is a MAC (mandatory access control) like Selinux ightarrow
- SIPs: "Operation not permitted" vs POSIX/ACLs: "Permission denied"

# System: SSV (Signed System Volume) + SIP (System Integrity Protection) +



- This topic is relevant to PMfM
- I'm not going to cover it except for this:



https://xkcd.com/149/

## macOS Authorization Database

- AuthDB is the macOS GUI authorization system (it doesn't do authentication)
  - Finder, System Settings, Application elevation requests
  - https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/authorization\_services
- AuthDB is like sudo for the GUI
- It's a whole framework
- The settings are stored in a sqlite db located at /var/db/auth.db
- PMfM modifies the database quite a bit (I'll get to that later)



## /System/Library/Security/authorization.plist Default Rights

- "" (default, catch all), rule: default
- "com.apple.", rule: default
- "com.apple.DiskManagement.", is-root, is-admin, on-console, default
- "com.apple.DiskManagement.internal.", is-root, is-admin, default
- "com.apple.DiskManagement.reserveKEK" (Key Encryption Key), root/admin
- "com.apple.KerberosAgent", mechanisms: KerberosAgent:kerberos-dialog...

## /System/Library/Security/authorization.plist Default Rules

- Classes
  - allow
    - Just do it
  - rule
    - Combination of rules
  - user
  - evaluate-mechanisms

## /System/Library/Security/authorization.plist Default User Rules

- Checks if user is in a group
  - <u>appstore</u>, <u>developer</u>, <u>lpadmin</u>\*, <u>lpoperator</u>, <u>mbsetupuser-nonshared</u>, <u>webdeveloper</u>, <u>admin</u>, <u>appserveradm</u>, <u>appserverusr</u>, <u>staff</u>
  - Key: admins only, admins and non-admins, \*I add non-admins to \_Ipadmin
- Options
  - allow-root, authenticate-user, entitled, entitled-group, extract-password (FDE, Continuity), password-only, require-apple-signed, session-owner, shared, timeout, vpn-entitled-group

## /System/Library/Security/authorization.plist Default Evaluate-mechanism Rules

- /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins
  - https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/authorization\_plugins/extending\_authorization\_services\_with\_plug-ins
- /System/Library/CoreServices/SecurityAgentPlugins
  - CryptoTokenKit, DiskUnlock, FamilyControls, HomeDirMechanism, KerberosAgent, LocalAuthentication, loginKC, loginwindow, MCXMechanism, PKINITMechanism, PSSOAuthPlugin, RestartAuthorization

## PMfM Changes



# (E) BeyondTrust

## macOS vs PMfM

- macOS model
  - admin, standard, guest users
- PMfM model
  - Everyone is a macOS standard user
  - Give those users "Workstyles:" High, medium, and low flexibility
  - High = admin, medium = power user, low = standard
  - And you get to fine tune it to meet your specific needs

# How To Learn the PMfM Model?

- Create 3 accounts on a test computer 0
  - "high"
  - "med"
  - "**OW**"
- Create filters for each workstyle that match those names
- Login and test it all out
- (This might be the most valuable slide of this presentation...)

# **PMfM Privilege Elevation ("Messages")**

- PMfM has it's own authentication dialogs
  - PMfM can silently deny (kills the process)
  - PMfM can allow but require the user to enter an explanation
  - PMfM can require a one time code
  - And more...

# PMfM Changes

- System Extension uses the EndpointSecurity framework
  - Listens for and approves execution events
- Finder Extension
  - Implements install and uninstall actions for downloaded apps
- /etc/sudo.conf added (<u>https://linux.die.net/man/8/sudo\_plugin</u>) Plugin avecto\_policy /usr/local/libexec/Avecto/Defendpoint/1.0/sudo/sudoers.so
- Authorization DB changes and Authorization Plugin

## **Authorization Database Changes**

- ~90 out of ~140 rules are changed (or something like that, too many rules)
- "If you don't set something in PMfM then it goes back to the defaults"
- Except fine grained default authob rules have been replaced w/ PMfM
- These authols changes are global and so they apply for admin users as well
  - Meaning installing PMfM changes the default setup, even w/o a profile

## Items w/ session-owner replaced

- com.apple.configurationprofiles.userenrollment.install
- com.apple.icloud.passwordreset
- com.apple.Safari....
- system.identity.write.self
- system.platformsso.auth

# PMfM's Changes

- How to view the changes
  - `sqlite3 /private/var/db/auth.db .dump`
  - `/usr/bin/security authorizationdb read \*name\*`
- `sudo /usr/local/bin/pmfm authorization enable` or `disable` to toggle
  - ~90 out of ~140 rules are changed to be either
    - com.avecto.defendpointd.standard
    - dppolicyplugin:magicmechanism.

## Login is not modified by PMfM Login is managed by the `system.login.console` rule

builtin:prelogin builtin:policy-banner loginwindow:login builtin:login-begin builtin:reset-password,privileged loginwindow:FDESupport,privileged builtin:forward-login,privileged builtin:auto-login,privileged

PKINITMechanism:auth,privileged builtin:login-success loginwindow:success HomeDirMechanism:login,privileged HomeDirMechanism:status MCXMechanism:login CryptoTokenKit:login PSSOAuthPlugin:login-auth loginwindow:done

# Some of the Changed Rights and Rules

<ul> <li>com.apple.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>com.apple</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>com.apple.app-sandbox.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>com.apple</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>com.apple.applepay.reset</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>com.apple</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>com.apple.appserver.privi</li> </ul>	lege. • com.apple
<ul> <li>com.apple.configurationpl</li> </ul>	ofiles. • com.apple
<ul> <li>com.apple.container-repair</li> </ul>	r • com.apple
<ul> <li>com.apple.DiskManageme</li> </ul>	ent.internal. • config.
<ul> <li>com.apple.library-repair</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>sys.openfi</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>com.apple.pf.rule</li> </ul>	• system.cs
<ul> <li>com.apple.security.sudo</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>system.gld</li> </ul>

- le.SoftwareUpdate.
- le.system-extensions.admin
- le.system-migration.
- le.tcc.util.admin
- le.trust-settings.admin
- le.uninstalld.uninstall
- file.
- sfde.requestpassword.weak
- system.global-login-items.

- system.install.
- system.keychain.modify
- system.login.tty
- system.preferences
- system.print.
- system.privilege.admin
- system.services.network extension.
- system.sharepoints.
- system.volume.

## `security authorizationdb read system.preferences.accounts`

## Before

<key>allow-root</key> <true/> <key>authenticate-user</key> <true/> <key>class</key> <string>user</string> <key>group</key> <string>admin</string> <key>session-owner</key> <false/> <key>shared</key> <false/> <key>timeout</key> <integer>2147483647</integer> <key>tries</key> <integer>10000</integer>

## After

<key>class</key>

<string>rule</string>

<key>default-prompt</key>

<dict>

<key>PMFM</key>

<string>interactionAllowed</string>

</dict>

```
<key>k-of-n</key>
```

```
<integer>1</integer>
```

```
<key>rule</key>
```

<array>

<string>is-root</string>

<string>com.avecto.defendpointd.standard</string>
</array>

# The Default Template Policy

- Created by the company
- The template changes!
- There's no way for you to know which version you have except by checking when you created it (so date your policies)



r policy	<b>TEMPLATE POLICIES</b> Utilities > Template Policies Import an XML file containing the policy	y configuration.				
* New Feature	Merge Policy Overwrite Policy					
stant Beta	This action will replace your e case you wish to revert back t	existing policy, it is advised to download your existing policy first to your previous policy configuration				
)	EXPORT EXISTING POLICY					
icy	Discovery	é OuiskStart For Mas				
Policies	CuickStart For Mac					
udit Scripts	QuickStart For Windows	<ul> <li>Designed from experience of implementing solutions across thousands of customers.</li> <li>Configured with Privilege Management &amp; Application Control</li> <li>Balanced security with user freedom</li> </ul>				
Ile Scripts	Server Roles					
Agent Settings	TAP (High Flexibility)	As every environment is different, we recommend this configuration is tested to ensure it complies with the				
ection Settings	TAP (High Security)	requirements of your organisation.				
e UUIDs						

**OVERWRITE POLICY** 



# The Policy Lives In A Single File

tion

3 items						
	Neme 🔺	Locked By	Created	Groups Assigned	Size	
	dept-sbs-mac		11/03/2023 12:47 PM	1	504.80 KB	
~	dept-sbs-mac-testing		07/09/2024 12:58 PM	1	144.97 KB	
					<ul> <li>Open Policy</li> </ul>	
	dept-sbs-windows		11/03/2023 12:48 PM	1	View Policy Details	
					C Edit & Lock Policy	
					Edit Properties	
					🔒 Assign Policy to Groups	
					🛓 Download Latest Revisio	
					1 Upload Revision	

/etc/defendpoint/ic3.xml

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="no"?>
<Configuration PolicyName="dept-sbs-mac-testing" RevisionNumber="8" Version="5.4.197.0" ID="8eabbbf2-2aef-44da-b47f-
 <RegistryValues />
 <ApplicationGroups />
  <MessagePoliciesOSX>
    <MessagePolicyOSX Reason="Required" ShowCancel="true" ChallengeResponseRetention="Once" MaxCRFailures="0" IdpSupp</pre>
    <MessagePolicyOSX Reason="None" ShowCancel="true" ChallengeResponseRetention="Once" MaxCRFailures="0" IdpSuppress</pre>
    <MessagePolicyOSX Reason="None" ShowCancel="true" ChallengeResponseRetention="Once" MaxCRFailures="0" IdpSuppres</pre>
    <MessagePolicyOSX Reason="Predefined" ShowCancel="true" ChallengeResponseRetention="Once" MaxCRFailures="0" IdpSu</pre>
    <MessagePolicyOSX Reason="None" ShowCancel="true" ChallengeResponseRetention="Once" MaxCRFailures="0" IdpSuppress</pre>
    <MessagePolicyOSX Reason="None" ChallengeResponseRetention="Once" MaxCRFailures="0" IdpSuppressionDuration="0" SH</pre>
  </MessagePoliciesOSX>
  <Policies />
  <MessagePolicies />
  <Sandboxes />
  <ApplicationGroupsOSX>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Hidden="true" Name="(Default) Any Application" Description="" ID="c274782d-c21b-4f25-b1e9-15</pre>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Hidden="true" Name="(Default) Any Authorization Prompt" Description="" ID="79a736df-6ea4-461</p>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Hidden="true" Name="(Default) Any Signed Authorization Prompt" Description="" ID="631c42e2-</pre>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Hidden="true" Name="(Default) Any Sudo Command" Description="" ID="b7de0e77-f36c-4642-825b-c</pre>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Hidden="true" Name="(Default) Any Trusted & amp; Signed Authorization Prompt" Description=""</p>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Hidden="true" Name="(Default) Authorize - Delete from /Applications" Description="" ID="38b]</pre>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Hidden="true" Name="(Default) Authorize – Install to /Applications" Description="" ID="b5ebd</p>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Hidden="true" Name="(Default) Authorize - System Trusted" Description="" ID="9770e35a-67ca-4</pre>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Hidden="true" Name="(Default) Passive – System Trusted" Description="" ID="caf50b0a-1127-44!</p>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Hidden="true" Name="(Default) Privilege Management Tools" Description="" ID="ad64f5d1-3d11-4</p>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Name="(Recommended) Restricted Functions" Description="" ID="4d0136cc-3449-4480-88e1-2d49c96</pre>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Name="Authorize - All Users (Business Apps)" Description="" ID="8a48023c-38c4-4ece-9835-7a2;</pre>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Name="Authorize - All Users (macOS Functions)" Description="" ID="cbc7ab01-a67e-427c-b0f0-f"</pre>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Name="Authorize – High Flexibility" Description="" ID="ed6adde0-d8a1-463a-8765-8798d2cececa'</p>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Name="Authorize - Low Flexibility" Description="" ID="8f9e203f-137b-4bad-b676-2d36fa195561"</pre>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Name="Authorize - Medium Flexibility" Description="" ID="18fd4bee-9bbe-491a-8987-3b2ca4b720</pre>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Name="Block - Blocked Apps" Description="" ID="9d7adbc9-d2c8-4ef5-b91f-c52d419de276"> column /A
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Name="Passive – Allowed Functions & amp; Apps" Description="" ID="bc3accf8-b91d-4524-8766-be!</p>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Name="Passive - High Flexibility (Business Apps)" Description="" ID="410e1bbc-a4a1-484d-ac83</pre>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Name="Passive - Low Flexibility (Business Apps)" Description="" ID="c27e01f6-970d-4fd9-bc81-</pre>
    <ApplicationGroupOSX Name="Passive - Medium Flexibility (Business Apps)" Description="" ID="c79a15ff-db78-4aff-94</pre>
  </ApplicationGroupsOSX>
  <Licenses />
  <URLGroups />
  <GlobalOptionsSets> co </GlobalOptionsSets>
  <ContentGroups />
 <Files> co </Files>
 <Tokens />
  <Policies0SX>
    <PolicyOSX Name="All Users" Description="" Disabled="true" GlobalOptionsSet="da697c7f-e4e8-4615-9e6c-d6e6c5f95b5</pre>
    <PolicyOSX Name="High Flexibility" Description="" GlobalOptionsSet="da697c7f-e4e8-4615-9e6c-d6e6c5f95b5f" ID="3d9</pre>
    <PolicyOSX Name="Medium Flexibility" Description="" Disabled="true" GlobalOptionsSet="da697c7f-e4e8-4615-9e6c-d6e
    <PolicyOSX Name="Low Flexibility" Description="" Disabled="true" GlobalOptionsSet="da697c7f-e4e8-4615-9e6c-d6e6c!</pre>
  </PoliciesOSX>
  <PasswordSafeLocalRotation> co </PasswordSafeLocalRotation>
</Configuration>
```



## All The Levels

- Computers
  - Computer Groups
    - Policies
      - Workstyles (activated w/ "Filters")
        - - **Application Groups** 
            - Application

Application Rules = Application Group + Action + Messages

## The Default Template

- 4 Workstyles (Really just 3)
- 11 Application Groups 0
  - 77 Application Rules
- 6 Messages



https://www.beyondtrust.com/docs/privilege-management/mac/admin/policies-and-templates/templates.htm



## WORKSTYLES macOS > Workstyles $\sim$ **Filter by** $\sim$ С Create New Workstyle 1 $\sim$ 4 items € Application Groups (11) × # Application # Enabled Name # Filters Priority Rules Applications $\sim$ 6 (6 enabled) 49 (49 enabled) All Users No **High Flexibility** Yes 11 (11 enabled) 28 (28 enabled) 1 2 $\mathbf{\sim}$ \* New Feature 3 Medium Flexibility No 11 (11 enabled) 28 (28 enabled) Low Flexibility 11 (11 enabled) 28 (28 enabled) 4 No



# **Application Groups**

- 44 are hidden, named "(Default)"
- Click "Show Hidden" to view all application groups



CATION GROUPS					
Application Groups					
by					
te New Application Group	<b>Q</b> Search	Show Hidden	📋 Paste		
e 🔺	Descriptic	n			
mmended) Restricted Funct	ions				
orize - All Users (Business Apps)					
orize - All Users (macOS Functions)					
orize - High Flexibility					

# Application

- Application can be one of:
  - Binary
  - Bundle
  - Package
  - Script
  - Sudo command
  - System Preference Pane

File /

File F

File F

Sourc

Min F

Max

Appli Auth

Publi

## EDIT MACOS APPLICATION: SYSTEM PREFERENCE PANE

macOS > Application Groups > (Recommended) Restricted Functions > Edit MacOS Application

Folder Name	$\oslash$	Application Description Users and Groups - Sys	tem Settings	
lash (SHA-1)	0			File / Folder Name
lash (SHA-256)	$\oslash$	File / Folder Name	Exact Match	/System/Library/ExtensionKit/Extensions/UsersGroups.app
ce	$\oslash$	File Hash (SHA-256)	File Hash	
ile Version	$\odot$	Source	Contains <b>•</b>	Source
File Version	$\oslash$	Min File Version	Min File Version	
cation Requests orization	$\oslash$	May File Version	Max File Version	
sher	$\odot$	Wax File version		Auth Request LIRI
		Application Requests Authorization	Contains	*
		Publisher	Exact Match	Publisher Software Signing



## Application

	Binary	Bundle	Package	Script	Sudo	Pref Pane
File / Folder Name	X	X	X	X	X	X
File Hash (SHA-1)	X	X	X	X	X	X
File Hash (SHA-256)	X	X	X	X	X	X
Source		X				X
URI		X				
Min File Version		X				X
Max File Version		X				X
<b>Application Requests Authorization</b>	Х	X	X			X
Command Line Arguments	X			X	X	
Publisher	X	X	X		X	X
Parent Process	X	X		X	X	
Install Action match		X				
Delete Action match		X				



# How to Learn 77 Application Rules?

- 20 years ago I learned XSLT and then forgot it. So, I asked AI and...
- xsltproc -o output.csv ApplicationGroupOSX.xsl default-mac-template.xml
- I split the data into 2 focus areas:
  - Application groups and rules
  - Application Rules (Application groups, Message, Action)
  - Demo

## **Problems I've Encountered**

- Printing
- Ejecting USB
- Couldn't get policies to update on clients (so frustrating and time wasted...)
- Couldn't get policies to work (I forgot to add the license to the policy)
- 30-60 second Freezes every 60 minutes (crashes)
- Admin account doesn't work unless you restart

## Resources

- Tom Ziegmann 2022 Mac Admins presentation: https://stream.lib.utah.edu/index.php?c=details&id=13526
- Join the #beyondtrust-priv-man Slack <u>https://www.macadmins.org/</u>